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AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 
IN THE FUNCTION DEBATE 
INTRODUCTION 
Philosophical interest in the biological concept of function stems largely 
from concerns about its teleological associations. Assigning something a 
function seems akin to assigning it a purpose, and discussion of the purpose 
of items has long been off-limits to science. Analytic philosophers have 
attempted to defend 'function' by showing that claims about functions do 
not involve any reference to a problematic notion of purpose. To do this, 
philosophers offer short lists of necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
application of the concept-where the conditions involve only acceptable 
physical or biological notions-and claim that the set of conditions captures 
the import of function statements. 
One problem is that no such set of conditions fits biological use perfectly, 
and debate among the various approaches rages. Proposals can be separated 
into two main categories. Etiological accounts include a condition referring 
to the natural selection of the trait in question, while Non-etiological accounts 
abjure any such reference. Now, thirty years after the Etiological approach 
first attracted widespread support (after Wright [1973]), the two sides remain 
at odds. Perhaps most importantly, some real-life cases and thought exper-
iments appear to show that Etiological accounts limit function ascriptions 
unacceptably, while other cases suggest that Non-etiological accounts assign 
functions too liberally. Sadly, the debate over how to handle such cases, and 
whether modified accounts can avoid them, often degenerates into the "dull 
thud of conflicting intuitions" (to borrow an apt phrase from Bigelow and 
Pargetter 1987, p. 196). 
In this paper, I claim that the standoff between the two sides stems large-
ly from the assumption that the project is conceptual analysis, where accounts 
attempt to state the intension or extension of the current biological term or to 
describe biologists' criteria for its application. This sort of project relies on 
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questionable psychological and philosophical presumptions, however, and 
I propose that philosophers should drop the idea that the analysis of function 
is a project of this type. Instead, the various accounts should be judged as 
proposed definitions for new concepts, and accounts should be evaluated 
for whether these new concepts could carry out certain important theoreti-
cal roles in biology. Although this "pragmatic move" has been made many 
times in the history of philosophy and science, this sort of pragmatism has 
not been adequately appreciated in the function debate and in the philos-
ophy of biology more generally. 
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin in Section I by sketching three 
accounts of function. In Section II, I show how the distinction between 
them is epitomized by the debate over how to assign functions to the rear 
flippers of the sea turtle. In Section ill, I provide an overview of the reasons 
why the idea of conceptual analysis has come under fire from psycholog-
ical research and philosophical questions about meaning. In Section IV, I 
describe my alternative to conceptual analysis. In Section V, I describe earlier 
proposals in the function debate of alternatives to conceptual analysis and 
compare them with my proposal. In the Conclusion, I draw some lessons for 
thinking about the relation between the functions of living things and those 
of artifacts.I 
I. ACCOUNTS OF FUNCTION 
1.1 Two accounts of fanction: 
Accounts of function in analytic philosophy have focused on distin-
guishing between an item's effects and its fanctions; the lion's heart has 
many effects-making certain sounds, moving blood in certain ways-but 
pumping, and not thumping, counts as its function. Early philosophical ac-
counts claimed that functions are those effects that are necessary for survival 
and reproduction, and this sort of approach can be called the "Survival and 
Reproduction" (SR) account. As Bigelow and Pargetter (1987) put it: an 
effect of a trait is a function just as long as "it confers a survival enhancing 
propensity on a creature that possesses it" (p. 192).2 
Theories of this sort have been challenged by cases that suggest that 
they assign functions too liberally. For example, the SR account has the con-
sequence that the human nose has the function of holding up glasses and the 
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human heart has the function of alerting doctors to dangerous ailments 
(Wright 1973, p. 148). An SR account would give the weight of a flying fish 
the function ofretuming it to the water (Williams 1966, pp. 11-12). These 
and other problems led some theorists to adopt the "Natural Selection" 
(NS) account (as I'll call it): a trait only has a function F if it was favored 
by natural selection for doing F. According to NS, the nose doesn't have 
the function of holding up glasses since it was never favored by selection 
for doing this.3 
But while SR accounts face the charge of assigning functions too 
liberally, NS accounts have to confront cases in which they appear too strin-
gent. Christopher Boorse (1976, pp. 74-75) first presented the thought ex-
periment of "Accidental Animals" (as I'll call it): Imagine that the lion 
species did not exist, and then an individual lion came into being due to a 
random collision of molecules. According to NS, its "heart" would not have 
the function of pumping blood, since it was never favored by selection for 
doing this, and this conflicts with intuitions that it should count as having 
this function, despite its unusual history. Critics of Etiological accounts 
have utilized this sort of thought experiment a number of times with some 
twists.4 Responses by Etiological theorists have either questioned the 
relevance of such imaginary cases (e.g., Millikan 1989) or argued that we 
should accept the initially counterintuitive conclusion that such organs are 
functionless (e.g., Neander 1991a). 
1.2 Pluralism: 
In addition, some Etiological theorists have accepted that the traits of 
accidental animals can be said to have functions in some sense. The "Pluralist 
account," as I'll call it, proposes that there are two (or more) concepts of 
function in biology, one defined etiologically and the other non-etiologi-
cally (e.g., Millikan 1989, Neander 199la, b; Godfrey-Smith 1993, 1994). 
Since these theories claim that at least one concept in biology is defined by 
an Etiological account, I will count them as Etiological theories, and I'll 
focus on this form of the Etioloical account for the rest of the paper. Various 
names for the two concepts have been proposed: I'll follow those who call 
the etiological concept "proper function" and the non-etiological one "causal-
role function."5 For the purposes of this paper, I will consider a Pluralist 
account where the concept of proper function is defined by an NS account, 
while the concept of causal-role function is defined by the SR account.6 
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Pluralism must provide some explanation of how to tell when one or 
the other concept of function is at work in biology, and different theorists 
have proposed different tests. Millikan (1989) and Neander (1991a) write 
that "proper function" plays two key theoretical roles that "causal-role func-
tion" cannot; if an occurrence of "function" is playing one of these roles, 
then it should be taken to mean "proper function." The first role is placing 
items in functional categories like 'heart'. An item is a heart, they argue, 
only if it has the proper function of pumping blood. Just having the causal-
role function of pumping blood is not sufficient to make something a 
heart: an organ that happens to pump blood due to a unique mutation, and 
thus has this causal-role function but not proper function, is not a heart, 
they argue. Similarly, it is not necessary for an item to have the causal-role 
function of pumping blood to be a heart: some objects are still hearts even 
though they cannot pump blood, such as those which are "atrophied, clogged, 
congenitally malformed, or sliced in two" (Neander 199la, p. 180). These 
are still hearts, just dysfunctional ones. 
This leads to the second role for "proper function," of determining which 
states of an organism count as dysfunctional. A trait-token will only count 
as dysfunctional if it fails to carry out the proper function of its trait-type, 
not if it has simply stopped carrying out a beneficial causal-role function. 
Similarly, a piece of driftwood can serve as a paddle, and may even be 
said to have this function in some sense, but it would be peculiar to say 
that it is a paddle or to say that it is a dysfunctional paddle since it has broken 
in half (following Millikan 1989, p. 295).7 
Thus we can see how Pluralism will interpret the case of accidental 
animals. The "heart" of accidental lions has the causal-role function of 
pumping blood, contributing in certain ways to survival and reproduction, 
but doesn't have this proper function. Thus it is not really a heart at all, 
despite initial appearances. If the "heart" were to stop, it would not be dys-
functioning. The SR account, in contrast, would count the accidental animal 
as having a heart and would judge it as dysfunctional if it stopped. 
Is there a way to tell which of these implications about the "hearts" 
of accidental animals is correct? It seems that intuitions can be led either 
way, and thus the "dull thud of conflicting intuitions" threatens (c.f. 
Bigelow and Pargetter [1987, p. 188]), and Neander [1991a, pp. 179-80]). 
What we need is a real-life case where we can see what biologists actually 
say, which leads us to the rear flippers of sea turtles. 
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II. THE CASE OF THE REAR FLIPPERS OF SEA TURTLES: 
Sea turtles exhibit many features that are well-suited to their aquatic 
lifestyle. The legs of their amphibious ancestors have lengthened and 
broadened into flippers that propel and guide the animals through water. 
Given the extensive associated modifications, including changes in muscles, 
bones, and skin, it is clear that natural selection has been responsible for 
at least some of these changes (Hirayama 1998).s But the rear flippers also 
play another crucial role in the species: digging a hole in which females 
hide and protect eggs until hatching (c.f. LeBuff [1990, pp. 62-64] and 
Kuchling [1999, pp. 83-84]). 
The rear legs' role in digging, unlike their role in swimming, may 
never have been favored by selection over alternatives for playing this role. 
This is because in order for selection to occur there must be a difference 
in fitness based on heritable variation in ability to achieve the important 
effect (Lewontin 1970, 1978, Sober 1993). If there has been no heritable 
variation in sea turtle flippers in their ability to dig, then there has been no 
selection among flippers for digging.9 Thus, according to Pluralism, aiding 
swimming is a proper function (and a causal-role function) of the limbs, 
while digging is just a causal-role function. In contrast, the SR account does 
not acknowledge a crucial distinction between these two functions. 
Thus the rear flippers appear to be a good test case to examine the 
difference between the theories (our representative Etiological and Non-
etiological accounts), and the case has attracted attention because of this. 
Other examples of "exaptations"-traits that play useful roles that may 
never have been favored by selection-can serve as well.IO Some fishing 
birds hold their wings out to the side to cast a shadow that highlights their 
prey in the water below them, and this "mantling" has been described as 
a paradigm exaptation since there is no evidence that selection has acted 
to favor the wings' playing this role (Gould and Vrba 1982, pp. 7-8; 
Millikan 1993, p. 44). Another claimed paradigm exaptation has been the 
role of the sutures in the human skull in easing the baby's transit down the 
birth canal. Here I will concentrate on the case of the sea turtle's rear 
flippers, but similar points could be made about these other cases. 
When Millikan (1993) initially highlighted the sea turtle flippers in 
the function debate, she argued that it is unacceptable that the flippers 
should fail to count as having the proper function of digging, and she pro-
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posed extending the definition of 'proper function' to include cases like 
this, as follows. Although the flippers were never favored by selection for 
digging, they crucially played this role during the selection of other traits, 
and she proposed that this should be enough to ascribe a trait a proper 
function (1993, p. 48). But this proposal runs into the same problems with 
liberality that the SR account initially faced (Preston 1998)-the weight of 
the flying fish might have the proper function of returning the fish to 
water-and Millikan (1999) has dropped the proposal. It looks like the 
Pluralist account has to be comfortable with the idea that exaptations have 
only causal-role functions. But is this tenable? 
Because the sea turtle flippers are a real-life case, we have the option 
of consulting the biological literature, rather than our perhaps unreliable 
intuitions. And given the two specific roles of proper functions-assigning 
items to functional categories and determining which conditions count as 
dysfunctional-there are two specific implications to check. First, the 
flippers should not be placed in a functional category based on their 
digging, and this seems to be correct. The limbs are flippers after all, based 
on their proper function of propelling and guiding movement through water, 
not "diggers." A review of the biological literature shows that biological 
usage accords with this; although it is acknowledged that back limbs dig, 
they are not described as "diggers" or anything similar.II Pluralism works 
so far. 
The second consequence of Pluralism, concerning dysfunction, raises 
more complications. The implication is that if a sea turtle's rear flippers 
could propel the animal through water but could not dig, they would not 
count as dysfunctional. We must note that the relevant case is relatively 
specific, for the following reasons. Consider a flipper that cannot aid in swim-
ming or digging: this flipper could be counted as dysfunctional based on its 
failure to carry out the proper function of swimming. Pluralism will only 
block the attribution of dysfunction if the flipper aids swimming success-
fully but can't accomplish digging. And a review of the literature again 
shows no cases that conflict with this relatively narrow consequence.12 
A critic of the Etiological approach could still appeal to a lingering 
sense that biologists would count a flipper of this sort as dysfunctional, 
and one could probably find biologists who would agree. On the other 
hand, we might also find biologists who disagree, and agree with Pluralism's 
conclusions that such flippers would not be dysfunctional. More commonly, 
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biologists will become impatient with the whole discussion, seeing the 
question as pointless. The dangers of irresolvable conflict, and seemingly un-
important semantic debate, looms. 
So even though the turtle flippers present a real-life case, discussion 
leads to stalemate over intuitions again. I believe that this case and others 
like it show that deciding on an account of function should not be taken as 
making a claim about the current concept of function at work in biology. 
Instead, choosing an account requires deciding how to draw lines that have 
never been present in biology before. 
Ill. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND ITS PROBLEMS 
The "dull thud of conflicting intuitions" that arises in the function 
debate should be familiar from other areas of analytic philosophy at-
tempting conceptual analysis. Discussions of everything from "justice" in 
moral philosophy to "justification" in epistemology are beset by standoffs 
over how to interpret thought experiments and problem cases. And there 
is good evidence that problems with the project of conceptual analysis-
conceming its psychological and philosophical presuppositions-lead to 
these quagmires. Philosophers have started to recognize these problems in 
these other areas, and I wish to raise some of these same concerns for the 
function debate (cf. Ramsey 1992, DePaul and Ramsey 1998, Brown 1999, 
Stitch 1998). 
Three aspects of the function debate fit the model of conceptual analysis 
quite well. First, proposed accounts of the concept are formulated as a short 
list of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for applying 
it. Secondly, accounts are tested by examining whether they apply in a 
range of real and imaginary situations. Lastly, accounts often explicitly 
aim at uncovering the meaning of the concept in question. In their classic 
papers, Wright (1973, p. 161) and Boorse (1976, p. 82) present their theories 
as analyses of what "the function of X is F ~" (My underlining and 
renaming of variables). 
Philosophers have identified two sets of problems with the project of 
conceptual analysis. One set stems from inadequacies of the "classic con-
ception of concepts," the idea that concepts can be represented by a short 
list of relatively simple criteria for their application (Ramsey 1992). Psy-
chologists have found that speakers do not appear to apply concepts according 
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to a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (cf. 
Ramsey 1992, Rosch and Mervis 1975). First, in many cases, no single char-
acteristic is shared by all members of the extension; that is, important prop-
erties for classifying an item under a given concept do not appear to be 
necessary ones. For example, although flying counts as an important property 
for classifying many animals as birds, some animals, such as ostriches, are 
recognized as birds even though they can't fly. 
Second, membership in an extension does not appear to be all-or-
nothing, as it is for the classic conception. Falcons are better examples of 
birds than ostriches, and this ordering of items is reflected by multiple dif-
ferent measures. Better examples are learned more easily, come to mind 
more quickly, and influence thought more powerfully (Ramsey 1992, p. 630). 
These two findings have led many psychologists to adopt a model of 
concepts that accords with Wittgenstein's (1953) "family resemblance." And 
this suggests that the search for a definition in the form of short list of rel-
atively simple conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient 
will not fit actual use by competent speakers. 
Philosophers committed to conceptual analysis, though, may well 
respond that they are not interested in the application of concepts by competent 
speakers, but instead in the meaning of concepts. But the assumed idea of 
meaning has faced increasingly sharp questioning by analytic philoso-
phers. If the meaning of a concept could be specified precisely, then each 
true statement involving the concept could be classified as analytic or syn-
thetic. And the attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, by Quine (1953, 
1961), Putnam (1961, 1975) and others, thus undermines the idea that 
meaning can be specified so precisely. Putnam (1961 ), for example, points 
out that kinetic energy was originally defined by the equation "e = 112 
mv2" and thus began as an analytic truth. Later, arguments for relativity theory 
disproved this equation, suggesting that at some point it had become a 
synthetic claim. Forcing all scientific beliefs into one or the other cate-
gory-"analytic" or "synthetic"-will warp the philosophical understand-
ing of science, Putnam argues convincingly. 
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLICATION 
Avoiding the problems of conceptual analysis requires adopting a 
new sort of philosophical project, one that avoids any claim to be uncov-
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ering meanings. The project of philosophical explication, as I will call it, 
resembles proposals made multiple times in the history of philosophy and 
science, perhaps most importantly in recent analytic philosophy by 
Carnap (1950, pp. 3-8) and Quine (1961, pp. 257--62).13 Quine (1961, p. 
260) writes that philosophical analysis begins with the recognition that a 
useful expression is also "somehow troublesome": " ... it is vague in 
ways that bother us," he writes, "or it puts kinks in a theory or encourages 
one or another confusion" (p. 260). Philosophers therefore propose new 
definitions for the expression that would allow it to continue to be useful 
without raising the problems. Quine describes the project clearly as replacing 
old terms with new ones: 
We do not claim synonymy. We do not claim to make clear and explicit what 
the users of the unclear expression had unconsciously in mind all along. We do 
not expose hidden meanings, as the words 'analysis' and 'explication' would 
suggest; we supply lacks. We fix on the particular functions of the unclear 
expression that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear 
and couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions. (pp. 258-59) 
Quine's recommendation mirrors the pragmatic approach of much current phi-
losophy of science, even if the details of his overall philosophical project do not. 
Applying this to the function debate eliminates the idea that philoso-
phers are attempting to capture some meaning already present in biology's 
concepts. The analysis of function began, as mentioned at the beginning 
of this paper, with the concern that the concept has problematic teleological 
associations. Considered as philosophical explications, Pluralism and the 
SR account should be evaluated as proposed definitions of new terms that 
can allegedly do the work of the old term but without the problems.t4Thus 
it is not surprising that any account will require some modification or clar-
ification of biological usage. Pluralism's specification of particular theoretical 
roles that the two concepts of function play fits quite well with consider-
ing it as a proposed philosophical explication. 
The success of a philosophical explication of 'function' will not depend 
on anyone's adopting and strictly following the definition from some point 
forward. Biologists may continue to use the word 'function' in ambiguous 
and even self-contradictory ways, and such use may have various metaphor-
ical or heuristic advantages. But in order for a function claim to be taken 
literally, the biologist should be willing to adopt a precise definition and 
present evidence that the relevant conditions are satisfied. 
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The availability of an account that could eliminate the vagueness and 
problematic teleological associations of 'function', while allowing biolog-
ical science to proceed roughly unchanged, would provide an answer of 
sorts to the concerns that began the investigation. Since a philosophical ex-
plication is not an account of current use or meaning, it stays silent on the 
question of whether the current biological concept has teleological overtones 
or involves teleological analogies. It simply establishes that the practice of 
assigning functions can continue without assuming or implying any unac-
ceptable teleological notions. And this should be enough, I believe, to answer 
the concerns that started the investigation. 
The availability of two (or more) incompatible accounts would similarly 
answer the original set of concerns. In this case, biologists would be free to 
choose either account to· explain the literal meaning of their terms. As long as 
we are looking for a way to replace traditional, problematic concepts with 
new, useful ones, two options are as good (if not better) than one. If the 
analysis of 'function' was conceptual analysis, the existence of two incom-
patible accounts would not be an acceptable conclusion to the discussion. 
Changing our understanding of the overall project thus changes our 
approach to the case of the sea turtles' rear flippers. In short, there is no answer 
to the question of whether the sea turtles' flippers really have this function 
and whether they have this function in a sense that is really different from their 
function of aiding swimming. Adopting the SR account, and deciding that the 
flippers do have the function of digging and swimming, or adopting the 
Pluralist account and deciding that digging is only a causal role function, 
reflects a decision about how to speak in the future, not a discovery about 
biological facts or the content of biological notions. Adopting either theory 
will clarify, in one way or another, something that was previously vague. 
V. PREVIOUS PROPOSALS 
Two important papers on "function" have described the problems with 
traditional conceptual analysis and proposed alternative ways to model the 
debate (Millikan 1989, Neander 1991a). Here I will review how my proposal 
relates to these earlier accounts. 
Neander (1991a) calls her analysis of function "conceptual analysis," 
but disavows any claim to be uncovering meaning. Instead, she says she is 
146 PETER H. SCHWARTZ 
" ... trying to describe the criteria of application that the members of the 
linguistic community generally have (implicitly or explicitly) in mind 
when they use the term" (p. 170). She rejects any a priori assumption that 
the criteria should be stated as a list of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
and she accepts that the criteria may be based on "family resemblance, 
similarity to prototypes, or Minskian frames" (p. 171). That said, she 
presents her own account of "proper function" as a two-part sufficient 
condition for the application of the term (p. 174). 
The biggest problem with characterizing the project as a search for 
criteria of application in people's minds is that it suggests the need for 
psychological rather than philosophical investigation. As mentioned 
above, and as Neander admits, such investigations usually find criteria 
based on similarity to prototypes rather than traditional necessary and suf-
ficient conditions (e.g., Rosch and Mervis 1975). In addition, here as in 
other areas competent speakers may not all share a single set of criteria. 
Neander claims that the dangers are minimized in the case of 'function' 
since, " . . . the relevant linguistic community consists of specialists, and 
the term under analysis is one of their specialist terms, and is also abstract 
(non-perceptual) and is embedded in well-articulated theory, ... " (171). 
For example, Neander points out, chemists all use the same criteria for 
'water', i.e., "liquid with molecular structure HOH" (172). 
The analogy with 'water' should not reassure, however. Although chem-
ists all explicitly learn and accept the definition Neander describes, this is 
not the case with biologists' use of 'function'. In fact, the lack of a commonly 
accepted definition fuels the concerns over teleological associations and 
vagueness that motivated the philosophical project in the first place. Finally, 
the term 'proper function', which Neander explicates, is an expression in-
troduced by philosophers, not biologists (Millikan 1984, 1989; Neander 
199la), as discussed above. 
There is a point of view from which Neander's methodology would be 
more consistent with her stated goal. Perhaps she imagines that her arguments 
and cases would convince a biologist that he has had the criteria for proper 
function "in mind" in some sense all along. This seems possible partly since 
Neander is not presenting any new biological facts, per se, so in some 
sense she is not telling the biologist anything that he didn't already know. 
On the other hand, the arguments could be seen as leading the biologist to 
adopt a new, more precise, criterion. My characterization of philosophical 
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explication avoids this debate entirely: at the conclusion the biologist 
accepts a definition, and thus a criterion for application, that he or she 
never explicitly recognized before. There is no need to add the claim that 
this refinement is a discovery. 
Millikan (1984) initially presents her definition of 'proper function' 
as stipulation, simply a tool in the statement of her philosophical views. 
She says that it allows her to draw attention to some analogies among a wide 
range of things, including traits of animals, behaviors, man-made artifacts, 
and language (1984, p. 38). She writes, "My program is far removed from 
conceptual analysis; I need a term that will do a certain job and so I must 
fashion one" (1984, p. 2). Later (1989), she argues that in fact her account 
is a good "theoretical definition" of the term 'function' in biology in certain 
contexts. She adamantly rejects any association with an idea of conceptu-
al analysis, and instead characterizes her claim as follows, 
A theoretical definition is the sort the scientist gives you in saying that water 
is HOH, that gold is the element with atomic number 79, or that consumption 
was, in reality, several varieties of respiratory disease, the chief being tuber-
culosis, which is an infection caused by the bacterium bacillus tuberculosis. 
(1989, p. 291) 
More specifically, she writes, is 
My claim is that actual body organs and systems, actual actions and 
purposive behaviors, artifacts, words and grammatical forms, and many 
customs, etc., all have proper functions, and that these proper functions cor-
respond to their functions or purposes ordinarily so called. Further, it is 
because each of these has a proper function or set of proper functions that it 
has whatever marks we tend to go by in claiming that it has functions, a 
purpose, or purposes. (p. 293, her italics) 
She adamantly rejects representing her position as a claim about the content 
of concepts currently at work in biology, instead modeling her claims as 
concerning the phenomena (Millikan 1999, 2002). 
I believe that my approach is largely compatible with hers as well, but 
philosophical explication disavows some claims that might be implied by 
her approach. For example, the analogies with definitions of 'water' and 
'gold' have to be handled carefully. Some accounts of natural-kind terms 
claim that their extensions are discovered by science and that the terms had 
their modem extensions even before anybody knew it. As Putnam (1975) 
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famously claims, Archimedes' term that we translate as 'gold' referred to 
the kind gold-i.e., all and only atoms with atomic number 79-long before 
modem chemistry arose.16 I would prefer to avoid any such implications in 
the setting of the debate over function, as well as any claim that items with 
proper functions form some sort of natural kind. Millikan would also disavow 
such claims, I believe (Millikan 2002 and personal communication). Deciding 
on the extension of a natural kind may well involve using stipulation to intro-
duce new, sharp boundaries. 
Thus, the project of philosophical explication builds on the proposals 
of Millikan (1989) and Neander (1991a) but avoids possible implications 
of their views. By presenting my account and comparing it with theirs, I hope 
to advance a discussion that they began in the function debate, a discussion 
which has not been pursued sufficiently since then. In this and other areas 
of philosophy, failing to articulate the goals of the philosophical analysis 
undermines the quality of the discussion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As may be clear, I believe that the Pluralist approach roughly sketched 
above can provide an adequate philosophical explication of 'function' in 
biology, although I believe that an SR account (properly specified) might 
offer a tenable alternative. This means there may be no fact of the matter 
whether the rear flippers of sea turtles have the function of digging in the 
same sense as they have the function of aiding swimming. And this should 
not be surprising, given the inherent vagueness in deciding on the precise 
meaning of any word. The Pluralist account's alternating classification of 
the flippers' digging-first as proper function in Millikan (1993) and then 
as causal-role function in Millikan ( 1999)-reflects vagueness in the current 
notion of function, which would only be eliminated by accepting one or 
another philosophical explication. 
Understanding this vagueness requires recognizing the metaphorical 
idea of design that lurks behind the biological notion of function. Proto-
typical adaptations appear as if they were designed to accomplish their end, 
even though it's generally accepted that natural selection is not literally a 
designer.11 This remains a very controversial area, and deciding whether natur-
al selection is literally a type of design may require choosing a philosoph-
ical explication of the idea of "design." Because of the ambiguous relation 
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between natural selection and design, it's unclear how much importance 
to put, when assigning functions, on the fact that selection occurred or not. 
And this is part of the reason for the vagueness in interpreting the functions 
of exaptations, I believe. 
The metaphorical idea of design lurking behind ideas of natural selection 
also provides a useful way to understand the link between artifact and bi-
ological functions. Since both the Pluralist and the Survival and Reproduction 
accounts refer to biological notions, they cannot serve as philosophical expli-
cations of the notion of function as applied to human artifacts. A separate 
theory will be necessary for artifacts, although there will most likely be 
important analogies between the two realms. For example, an account analo-
gous to Pluralism would distinguish between the aspects of artifacts that 
are designed and those that are not and would identify particular theoret-
ical roles for the different notions. Thinking about these links may require 
a further exploration of metaphorical thinking, even though assigning a 
function in each area can be perfectly literal. Theories in both areas should 
be evaluated as proposed philosophical explications, not conceptual analyses. 
Peter H. Schwartz 
Boston University 
NOTES 
1. I would like to thank Gary Ebbs, Gary Hatfield, Ruth Millikan, Shari Rudavsky, and 
Alfred Tauber for discussion of topics related to this paper. 
2. Some examples of SR accounts include Hempel (1965), Boorse (1976, 2002), and 
Buller (1998). I cannot do justice here to the important differences between these accounts, 
especially as regards functions outside of biology. 
3. Examples of NS accounts include Ruse (1971) and Wright (1973, 1976). As I will 
discuss below, I also place "Pluralist" accounts in this group. Again I cannot do justice here 
to the parts of these accounts that go beyond biology, or to the differences among them. 
4. E.g., see Bigelow and Pargetter (1987, p. 188) where they imagine the possibility 
that the whole world came into existence five minutes ago. 
5. Millikan (1989) proposes the terms 'proper function' and 'Cummins function' for 
the two concepts. Neander (199la, b), Griffiths (1992, 1993), and Preston (1998) adopt 
'proper function' for the etiological concept, but for the non-etiological concept Neander 
(199la, b) uses 'causal role function' and Preston (1998) uses 'system function'. Godfrey-
Smith (1993) calls the two concepts 'Wright function' and 'Cummins function'. Philosophers 
have been free to propose terms for the two concepts since philosophers, not biologists, 
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were the first to propound such a clear distinction between two concepts of function in 
biology. 
6. Pluralist accounts actually define the non-etiological notion following Cummins 
(1975), which differs from the SR account in important ways. The Cummins account, 
however, makes the same assignment of functions as the SR account in the cases consid-
ered in this paper, so my simplifying assumption does not affect my consideration of 
Pluralism here. 
7. Pluralists have proposed other ways to distinguish between 'proper function' and 
'causal role function'. Millikan (1989, p. 294) points to an association between 'proper 
function' and ideas of purpose, while Neander (199la, p. 180; 1991b, p. 454) points to 
links to normativity. In Godfrey-Smith's (1993, 1994) version of Pluralism, the distinction 
between the two types of function depends on the explanatory goals of the context in 
which the term is used. I believe these ways of distinguishing between the two concepts 
of function are less attractive than an approach that focuses on theoretical roles, and I will 
not discuss them further here. 
8. I discuss and defend the "weak adaptationism" involved here in Schwartz (1999b, 
2002). 
9. The flippers could be maintained by selection for digging, if heritably different 
flippers arise occasionally that dig less well and are eliminated because of this. But without 
any evidence of such variation, biologists cannot assume the occurrence of such mainte-
nance selection (or "stabilizing selection," as some biologists call it). I discuss these issues 
at more length in Schwartz (1999b, 2002). 
10. There has been a good deal of controversy over the precise definition of 'exapta-
tion' and the prevalence of exaptations in the biological world. C.f. Preston (1998), 
Dennett (1995, 1998), and Millikan (1999, 2002), for example. 
11. The review was conducted using the Biological Sciences database of the Cambridge 
Scientific Abstracts, an electronic index of the biological literature since 1982. Admitted-
ly, I cannot be confident that the search was absolutely complete, but the burden would 
now fall on critics to produce cases that conflict with Pluralism's implications. 
12. This review again utilized the Biological Sciences database of the Cambridge Sci-
entific Abstracts. 
13. Gary Ebbs has recently utilized a similar project in philosophy of language (2002), 
and he first recommended the Quinean approach to me (personal communication). Ramsey 
(1992, 69) also mentions Carnap's (1950) approach as a possible response to problems 
with conceptual analysis. I presented an earlier version of this paper at a session of the 
Boston Colloquium for Philosophy of Science in November 2001, where Philip Kitcher 
proposed a similar account of an alternative to conceptual analysis. 
14. I will mostly speak of philosophical explications as proposed definitions of .lllJ:Im, 
but in places I will also speak of concepts. I will use the notational practice of using single 
quotation marks to mention a term. Context will clearly indicate when a word is meant to 
mention a concept. 
15. Millikan's (1984) more precise account of"theoretical definition"-her "theoretical 
definition of 'theoretical definition'," as she calls it (1989, p. 291, n. 2)-is not useful in 
the present context since it utilizes the concept of proper function (as she points out [ibid]). 
16. This claim has been controversial. See, e.g., Donnellan (1983) and Ebbs (1997, pp. 
204-15; 2000). 
17. Dawkins (1982) for example defends the claim that living things appear as if they 
were designed, even if we know that their complex organs arose by natural selection and know 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS 151 
that natural selection is not literally a designer. I address these associations between natural 
selection and metaphorical ideas of design in my dissertation (Schwartz 1999a, ch. 2). 
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